Agents in the control group receive a standard volunteer contract often offer for this type of task whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive small financial rewards large financial rewards and non financial rewards respectively. The analysis yields three main findings.
First non financial rewards are more
Effective at eliciting effort than either financial rewards or the volunteer contract. The effect of financial rewards is much smaller and not significantly UK Phone Number List different from zero except for the poorest agents for whom the relative value of the reward is higher. Second contrary to existing laboratory evidence financial incentives do not appear to crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting. Third non financial rewards elicit effort both by leveraging intrinsic motivation for the cause and by facilitating social comparison among agents. Overall the findings demonstrate the power of non financial rewards to motivate agents in settings where there are limits to the use of financial incentives.
Download the paper Trade
Taxes AUTHORS Desai Mihir A. C. Fritz Foley and James R. Hines Jr. ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the extent to which firms use trade crit to Guatemala Phone Number reallocate capital in response to tax incentives. Tax induc differences in pretax returns encourage the use of trade crit to reallocate capital from firms facing low tax rates to those facing high tax rates. of U.S. multinational firms indicates that affiliates in low tax jurisdictions use trade crit to lend whereas those in high tax jurisdictions use trade crit to borrow lower local tax rates are associat with net trade crit positions that are . higher as a fraction of sales.
