Then they measur how the voting havior of that director chang when the chair who appoint him or her left the board as a measure of how that tie affects dissent. They found that after the chair left board memrs were percent more likely to dissent than fore. Dissent goes up even more significantly in the day period anticipating the breaking of the social tie by the chair departing the board memr departing or both.
In the two months fore
The end of the relationship dissent goes up percent. In fact percent of all dissent occurr in that day period even though the average director s tenure was about four years. They see there is less of a problem to rock the boat when they are leaving Luxembourg WhatsApp Number List speculates Ma. By contrast when Ma and Khanna measur the effects of firm performance on likelihood of dissent they found a much lower correlation. A one unit increase in the ratio of a firm s market value to assets value increas the likelihood of dissent by percent. Social ties are a tter prictor of dissent than firm performance concludes Ma. Dissent Punish By Markets The importance of this dissent is even more significant given the consequences it has on both the directors and their firms.
One might expect that dissent
Would perceiv as a good thing showing that independent directors are doing their jobs protecting the interests of shareholders. In fact Ma and Khanna Costa Rica WhatsApp Numbers List found the opposite. where dissent was evident with an average drop in share price of . percentage point on days in which dissent was announc. The directors themselves were also punish there was an average drop of more than percent in those board memrs annual income and percent less likelihood of staying on the director job market over those who didn t dissent.
